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1A GIANT WITHOUT LIMBS1: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S 
STATE-CENTRIC CO-OPERATION REGIME
Jackson  Nyamuya Maogoto*
[The International Criminal Court is one of the great international institutions in mankind’s history with the 
potential to reconfigure significant aspects of the international system with regard to criminal jurisdiction. But 
like the international penal institutions before it, the success of the ICC revolves around international 
cooperation. An institutional check on the ICC’s power is that it will have to work through States. States Parties 
will be asked to arrest and surrender suspects, investigate and collect evidence, extend privileges and immunities 
to ICC officials, protect witnesses, enforce ICC orders for fines and forfeiture and, at times, prosecute those who 
have committed offences against the administration of justice. The ICC will rely heavily on the cooperation of 
States Parties individually and collectively for its success. This article provides an analysis of the ICC’s 
international cooperation and judicial assistance regime as well as an insight into the approaches that States 
Parties have adopted in seeking to give effect to the letter and spirit of their obligations domestically.]
INTRODUCTION
It was at the end of World War II that the door to the future possibility of a permanent 
international criminal court was practically opened with the establishment of two international 
military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. In 1946, the inaugural session of the UN General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 95(I) which affirmed ‘the principles of international law 
recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the [IMT] 
Tribunal.’2 In 1951, the UN established a Special Committee of the General Assembly for the 
purpose of drafting a convention for the establishment of an international criminal court.3
After decades of political wrangling and disagreement in 1998, States finally agreed to adopt 
1
 This title is inspired in part by  the comments of Professor Antonio Cassese, former President of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia made in 1997. In an article, Professor Cassese noted:
...the ICTY remains very much like a giant without arms and legs – it needs artificial limbs to walk 
and work. And these artificial limbs are state authorities. If the cooperation of states is not 
forthcoming, the ICTY cannot fulfil its functions. It has no means at its disposal to force states to 
cooperate with it. [Emphasis added]
Antonio Cassese, ‘On Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law’, (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 1, 13
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2the Rome Statute for the establishment of an International Criminal Court,4 closing the circle 
on the efforts first inaugurated at the end of World War I. Support for the ICC was 
overwhelming.5 However, several key States, most notably the United States, were among 
those opposing or abstaining.
‘There is little doubt that the end of political and military confrontation between the super 
powers (also known as ‘cold war’) … supplied the necessary, albeit not sufficient, 
precondition for the efforts to create the International Criminal Court to be taken seriously. 
That political opportunity was, however, far from enough to render these efforts successful. 
Nonetheless, it developed the right climate in which the political will could grow and from 
which it eventually has emerged. But there was even more important component: the Rome 
Conference. It served as a litmus test to see whether or not the international community en 
globe [had] achieved such a level of development that would enable the nations to restore 
peace and order and maintain it, using the International Criminal Court.’6 The overwhelming 
support for the Court seems to reflect a growing belief that today, ‘nations, States and 
governments are capable of thinking and making decisions not only in particular (egoistic) 
categories, but also in a global context…Apparently, the majority of governments and their 
representatives in Rome came to the conclusion that justice for the most heinous crimes is 
much too serious and important to be meted out by individual States.’7
3
 See Report of the Sixth Committee, reprinted in Benjamin Ferencz, An International Criminal Court (1980) Vol 
2, 298-305; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN 
GAOR, 50th Sess, Supp No 22, UN Doc A/50/22.
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (Rome Statute), UN Doc A/CONF 183/9 reprinted in 37 
ILM 999. The Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, paving the way for the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court.
5 120 states voted in favour, 7 states against with 21 states abstaining.
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 Michael Plachta, ‘Contribution of the Rome Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of the ICC to the 
Development of International Criminal Law’ (1999) 5 University of California Davis Journal of International 
Law and Policy 181.
7
 Ibid.
3The dilemma of building agreement among State Parties without diluting core principles 
essential to an effective international penal regime coloured the Rome conference.8 The 
process of making the Rome Statute was a battleground regarding whether the ICC should 
establish a ‘vertical’ or a ‘horizontal’ paradigm vis-à-vis States. Elaborating on the nature of 
these paradigms, Professor Antonio Cassese notes: 
The former concerns relations between two sovereign States and is therefore a reflection of the 
principle of equality of States; it gives rise to a horizontal relationship. The latter, instead, concerns 
the relation between a State and an international judicial body endowed with binding authority; it is 
therefore the expression of a vertical relationship.9
Considering that fundamental norms, rules, and practices of international law rest on the 
premise of the State, the paradigm to be adopted was especially important to the ultimate 
effectiveness of the ICC. The reluctance of States to give way to international criminal 
jurisdiction with respect to matters which would otherwise be subject to their exclusive 
sovereignty was clear in negotiations that dealt with the allocation of jurisdiction between the 
court and national authorities. Many States were wary that an international penal process that 
was based on the ‘vertical’ paradigm would significantly contribute to the threatening of the 
overall concept of sovereignty. However, the ICC’s goal of attempting to influence the 
behaviour of individuals at all levels of authority and power through enforcement of 
international law only stood a good practical chance through incorporation of the tenets of a 
‘vertical’ paradigm which would limit States’ ability to frustrate the work of the ICC. In the 
end, a number of solutions adopted in the Rome Statute ‘differ from typical and traditional 
constructions, which transpire from international treaty regulations, with respect to constituent 
8
 Chimene Keitner, ‘Crafting the International Criminal Court: Trials and Tribulations in Article 98(2)’ (2001) 6 
UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 215, 271.
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4elements of particular forms of cooperation’10 a manifestation of the ‘vertical’ paradigm.
The challenge was the need for a trade-off between achieving consistency and building 
consensus.11 This was arguably more pronounced in part because the State was being called 
upon to reconfigure certain key aspects of its domestic jurisdiction as well as State-crafted 
inter-national regimes in favour of a functioning international regime.12 Consultations, 
consensus and compromise were at the heart of the Statute making process. In an articulate 
encapsulation of this triad, Professor M Plachta states:
Triple ‘C’ was a dominant tone at the Conference. Consultations-Consensus-Compromise describes 
both the organisational framework and the tools that were adopted at the Conference. While the first 
element is procedure-oriented, the last two are result-oriented, with one important distinction between 
them. The second component sets the threshold, whereas the third determines the contents of the final 
result. The first two elements out of this triad facilitate and encourage achieving the last one. That 
compromise will be a matter of ‘life and death’ became apparent at the very beginning of the 
Conference, when the delegates started presenting their positions specified in instructions from their 
capitals. Not surprisingly, those views reflected the many options and alternative solutions contained 
in the main Conference document. Compromise was, therefore, the only way out of this situation in 
order to avoid a stalemate. At the same time, the main concern of the delegates was the question of 
how to reach a middle ground and acceptable solution without compromising and endangering the 
whole underlying idea. For various reasons, compromise could have been criticised as rendering the 
adoption of the only ‘right’ or ideal solution impossible.13
Reflecting on the tension between domestic jurisdiction and international penal requirements 
Dr Chimene Keitner observes that, ‘[t]he Rome Statute embodies a carefully crafted 
compromise between a State-centred idea of jurisdiction, and a more inclusive international 
vision. The State-centred idea, in its extreme manifestation, would uphold a State’s exclusive 
jurisdiction to prosecute and try its own citizens for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity, and to prosecute and try citizens of other States who commit such acts on the 
territory of the forum State. An inclusive vision would promote the idea of universal 
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5jurisdiction, whereby individuals of any nationality could be tried for certain crimes by any 
State acting on behalf of humanity as a whole. The ICC follows a middle path.’14 Under the 
Rome Statute, primary jurisdiction is assigned to the ICC’s Member States with the ICC as a 
fallback mechanism. In the event that States are unwilling or unable to carry out their 
obligation to investigate and prosecute crimes, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction is 
triggered allowing the ICC to step in to fill the lacuna.15
The Statute adopted at the Rome Conference can be labelled a direct enforcement variant of 
international criminal law. It reflects the ‘Direct Enforcement Model’ as elaborated by 
Professor M C Bassiouni,16 which presupposes the existence of the International Criminal 
Court and the supporting machinery needed in any criminal justice system. It contains all the 
necessary elements of the criminal legislation, such as a ‘general part’ which typically 
includes the principles of criminal liability, defences, and sanctions, ‘code of criminal 
procedure,’ as well as problems traditionally discussed under the aegis of international 
cooperation in criminal matters.17
An intriguing aspect of the Rome Statute which underscores its nature as a constitutive 
document is that it combines jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, and to enforce all in one 
instrument. The Court’s success or failure revolves around its enforcement provisions as 
encapsulated in Part 9 of the Statute-the international cooperation and judicial assistance 
regime. The provisions of this part establish the conditions under which the international 
14
 Keitner, above n  8 at 225.
15 Both the Preamble to the Statute and art 1 express a fundamental principle of the Rome Statute: that the Court 
is to be ‘complementary’ to national criminal jurisdictions. Although complementarity is not defined (and 
indeed, there is no general ‘definition’ section in the Statute) there are definitional provisions within particular 
Articles).
6community, or more precisely the States Parties to the Statute, may enforce orders and 
directions of the Court. But like the international penal institutions before it, the success of the 
ICC revolves around international cooperation. An institutional check on the ICC’s power is 
that it will have to work through States in conducting investigations, obtaining evidence, and 
apprehending suspects. International cooperation and judicial assistance as set out in the 
Rome Statute is at the very heart of the ultimate effectiveness of the Court by placing an 
affirmative obligation on States.18
This Article has as its modest aim an exposition of the complex international cooperation 
regime that the Rome Statute sought to craft as well as placing this within the wider context of 
the international system. The goals are threefold: first, to provide a descriptive account 
surrounding the Rome Statute’s international cooperation and judicial assistance regime; 
second, to offer a legal analysis of the regime as well as an insight into the approaches that 
States have adopted in implementing their obligations and third, to expose the potential 
dangers facing the Court especially through Article 98 which contains provisions relating to 
waiver of immunity and consent to surrender.
THE BLASKIC CASE: UNDERLINING THE VITALITY OF A ‘VERTICAL’ 
PARADIGM & PREDICTING A TOUGH NEGOTIATION 
The creation of the ICTFY and the ICTR raised questions concerning the appropriate 
relationship between international ad hoc institutions and national courts. The Statutes of 
these Tribunals recognise that national courts have concurrent jurisdiction while clearly 
16
 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law’ (1983) 15 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 27, 37.
17
 See ibid 37-47 (describing direct and indirect enforcement models of international law).
7asserting the primacy of the International Tribunals.19 This extraordinary jurisdictional 
priority is justified by the compelling international humanitarian interests involved and by the 
Security Council’s determination that the situation in the former Yugoslavia, as well as that in 
Rwanda, constituted a threat to international peace and security. With regard to both ad hoc
tribunals, States needed to establish domestic procedures for implementing in order to give 
effect to the obligations or to comply with requests or orders concerning taking of evidence, 
the surrender or transfer of accused persons etc.
Many States subsequently modified domestic law or enacted new legislation to facilitate 
fulfilment of their obligations. The new balance achieved between the jurisdiction of national 
courts and that of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals in many ways marked the end of 
an era when the exercise of criminal jurisdiction fell within the unfettered prerogatives of the 
sovereign State. Though the Security Council created each of the two existing international 
criminal tribunals ad hoc as an extraordinary response to a specific and narrowly defined 
threat to international peace and security, to enable them to address these threats, the practice 
and application of the provisions of the ICTFY and the ICTR Statutes relating to international 
cooperation, foreshadowed the political and legal disputes over the creation of a permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the possible contours of its cooperation regime. 
In January 1997, when Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, presiding over Trial Chamber II 
agreed to the Prosecutor’s request to issue subpoenae duces tecum to the State of Croatia and 
18 Rome Statute, above n 4, Part 9 contains the provisions on the nature and type of international cooperation and 
judicial assistance by States.
19
 See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, annexed to 
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) (ICTFY 
Statute) (The Rules of Procedure and Evidence are in UN Doc IT/32 Rev 2 (1994)), art 9; The Statute of the 
8its Defence Minister, she opened the door for the ICTFY to demonstrate among other things 
the extent to which State sovereignty had been weakened by the international penal 
institutions as well as providing an opportunity to give a ringing endorsement of the ‘vertical’ 
paradigm as an appropriate model through which to give ‘teeth’ to international penal 
institutions in seeking to enforce the obligations of states to cooperate.
Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic20 was, until the summer of 1997, one of the more interesting 
cases before the ICTFY, if only because the promotion of Colonel Blaskic to General in 
August 199321 made him the highest-ranking detainee in The Hague. 22 On 15 January 1997, 
at the instigation of the Prosecutor, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald issued subpoenae duces 
tecum to the Republic of Croatia and to its Defence Minister Gojko Susak23 requesting 
thirteen specified categories of documents believed to be of evidentiary value in relation to 
the Blaskic Case.24 The subpoenae were issued pursuant to the Prosecutor’s request, relying 
International Tribunal for Rwanda is set out as an annex to SC Res 955,  UN SCOR, 49th Year, 3453D mtg, UN 
Doc S/RES/955 (1994) (ICTR Statute) contains identical language.
20
 The Prosecutor v Dario Kordic, Tihofil also known as Tihomir Blaskic, Mario cerkez, Ivan also known as 
Ivica Santic, Pero Skopljak, Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No IT-95-14 at <http:// www.un.org/ICTFY/> (Blaskic 
Case) (visited 14 March 2004), Indictment (original) (Indictment (original). Tihofil (also known as Tihomir) 
Blaskic was according to the indictment, a career military officer who had served as a captain in the Yugoslav 
Peoples Army (JNA). Throughout the Yugoslav conflict, he held the rank of colonel and was the Commander of 
the Central Bosnia Operative Zone of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). General Blaskic was indicted for 
‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Lasva river valley area in Central Bosnia between May 1992 and May 1993
21
 Ibid para 3.
22 By comparison, the case against Dusko Tadic, the first case to be fully tried by the summer of 1997, was that 
of a ‘small fish’--a local restaurant owner turned nationalist--who had little role in masterminding the conflict or 
its effects.
23
 On 15 January 1997, Judge McDonald also issued subpoenae duces tecum to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to 
the Custodian of the Records of the Central Archive of what was formerly the Ministry of Defence of the 
Croatian Community of Herbage Bosna. See Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of 
the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, at 3-4, Case No IT-95-14-AR108bis (29 October 1997) 
<http:// www.un.org/ICTFY/blaskic/Trialc1/decisionse/70718SP2.htm> (visited 9 December 2000) (Appellate 
Judgment on the Subpoenae) (citing subpoena duces tecum to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the Custodian of 
the Records of the Central Archive of what was formerly the Ministry of Defence of the Croatian Community of 
Herzeg Bosna, Judge McDonald, 15 January 1997).
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 See International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Press Release, ‘Trial Chamber II Hands Down 
its Decision on the Subpoena Issue: The Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Croatia and its Defence Minister in
January 1997 Must be Complied with by 18 August 1997’ (18 July 1997) (visited December 2000) 
<http://www.un.org/ICTFY/p230-c.htm> (Trial Chamber II Decision).
9on Articles 18(2) and 19(2) of the Statute and Rules 39(ii), (iv), and Rule 54 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.25 Croatia, in a letter dated 10 February 1997, declared its readiness 
for full cooperation under the terms applicable to all States but challenged the legal authority 
of the International Tribunal to issue a subpoena duces tecum to a sovereign State and 
objected to the naming of a high government official in a request for assistance pursuant to 
Article 29 of the Statute of the International Tribunal.26 The subpoenae were suspended ten 
days later by Judge McDonald in order to discuss ‘important questions of principle’ with the 
parties, including the power of a Judge to issue a subpoena to a sovereign State or to a high 
government official of that State.27
The Trial Chamber considered its own decision and on 18 July 1997 upheld and reinstated the 
subpoenae, declaring that ‘a Judge or Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal has the 
authority and power to issue orders to States and individuals, including high government 
officials, for the production of documents required for the preparation or conduct of a trial . . 
.’ and that those States and officials were under a clear obligation to comply with such 
orders.28 Declaring both the order and the term ‘subpoena’ to have been appropriate, the Trial 
Chamber demanded compliance by 18 August 1997.29
This was, however, met with further objections, and the subpoena issue went to appeal. On 22 
September 1997, Croatia’s challenge to the subpoenae duces tecum and the subpoena 
25
 See International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Press Release, ‘Blaskic Case: Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ordered to Comply with Prosecutor’s Request for Production of Documentary 
Evidence’, Background, para 1 (14 February 1997) (visited December 2000) <http:// www.un.org/ICTFY/p156-
e.htm>.
26
 See Appellate Judgment on the Subpoenae, above n 23 at 4 (citing letter from Mr Srecko Jelinic, 10 February 
1997).
27
 See Trial Chamber II Decision, above n 23.
28
 See The Blaskic Case, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Bulletin No 19, 4 VIII 1997, 
available at <http:// www.un.org/ICTFY/BL/bl19.htm>, (December 2000) ( Bulletin No 19).
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Decision of Trial Chamber II was heard by the Appeals Chamber.30 Surprisingly, the Appeals 
Chamber appeared to agree with Croatia, at least in part, and in a dramatic turn it 
‘unanimously quashed’ both subpoenae. Yet the drama of a unanimous decision to quash the 
subpoenae, on further examination, failed to change the direction of the Tribunal much at all. 
While quashing the subpoenae per se, the Appeals Chamber allowed the Prosecutor to submit 
a new request for a ‘binding order to [the State of] Croatia alone.’31
In effect the Appeal Chamber’s judgment extended the Tribunal’s reach beyond the power to 
indict, try, and imprison individuals by strengthening the Tribunal’s claim to demand the 
loosely defined ‘cooperation’ of States. In recalling Croatia’s challenge, in which the State 
contested the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to issue binding orders to States such as itself, the 
Appeals Chamber rejected this denial of jurisdiction as a ‘manifest misconception’32 and 
asserted that ‘it is self-evident that the International Tribunal, in order to bring to trial persons 
living under the jurisdiction of sovereign States, not being endowed with enforcement agents 
of its own, must rely on the cooperation of States.’33 It went on, in practical terms, to say that 
the International Tribunal ‘must turn to States if it is effectively to investigate crimes, collect 
evidence, summon witnesses and have indictees arrested and surrendered to the International 
Tribunal,’34 pointing to the very clauses that may be the most objectionable to the States. 
29
 See Trial Chamber II Decision, above n 23.
30
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Despite upholding Croatia’s arguments for State sovereignty, the Appeals Chamber also ruled 
that States would not be allowed to claim national security interests for withholding 
documents or other evidentiary materials requested by the International Tribunal unless the 
legitimacy of their concerns has been assessed by a Trial Chamber.35 The Appeals Chamber 
hoped to avoid frivolous appeals to State security by instituting a strict review standard on all 
such claims.
The Blaskic Case, then, may ultimately be most noteworthy for its role in more clearly 
defining the reach of the Tribunal over States themselves. With the handing down of the 
Appeal Chamber’s judgment on the subpoenae duces tecum--quashing the terminology but 
upholding the substance--the Tribunal gained some strength in terms of exacting from States 
more than the unwilling ‘cooperation’ to which they had bound themselves in the Dayton 
Accords. The Blaskic Case demonstrated that, backed up loosely by the Security Council, the 
Tribunal in fact has the power to issue binding orders to sovereign States.  
Though the Blaskic Case demonstrated the tenacity of the State in guarding its sovereignty it 
broke new ground. It demonstrated that the significance of international penal process and its 
accompanying tenet of international justice reflects an evolution in the perception of 
sovereignty heralding a qualitative shift which necessitates an ethical vision in which 
enforcement of international norms supersedes certain State rights and prerogatives. This 
institutionalisation of international penal process represents a shift in authority from States to 
the international community with the notion of international justice now pointing towards a 
sphere that though controlled by States, is ineffaceably external to power. It was against the 
background of this monumental case as well as the trials and tribulations that the two ad hoc 
35
 See Press Release, above n 25.
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international criminal tribunals had encountered in their operations that States assembled in 
Rome in the summer of 1998 with the goal of creating a permanent international penal 
tribunal.
THE ROME STATUTE’S INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND JUDICIAL 
ASSISTANCE REGIME
Given that the Court does not have at its disposal its own police, military or law enforcement 
forces, it has to rely entirely on the assistance rendered by the authorities of the States. 
Moreover, since the Court is not allowed to hold trials in the absence of the accused, the only 
way to avoid the Court being completely paralysed is to provide it with a tool that can be used 
to effectively secure the presence of defendants before it. The extent to which States, by 
becoming parties to the Rome Statute, take on obligations to assist the ICC in activities on 
their own territory is very much an issue of sovereignty. As with other areas defining the 
relationship between the ICC and States, the Rome Statute’s final text balances the 
willingness of States to make commitments necessary for the ICC to function, with a 
recognition that the ICC will operate in a world of sovereign States.36 As Jerry Fowler notes,
[t]he accommodation of sovereignty begins with the nature of the general obligation that States 
undertake by becoming parties to the ICC Statute. Proponents of a strong ICC favoured a duty to 
‘comply’ with orders, rather than an obligation of ‘cooperation,’ which was deemed to be vague and 
weak. Article 86 of the ICC Statute, ‘[g]eneral obligation to cooperate,’ reflects the latter formulation, 
requiring State Parties to ‘cooperate fully with the Court.’ In an art form solution, however, specific 
articles on surrender of suspects and other forms of cooperation require States to ‘comply with 
requests’ from the ICC.37
36
 See Phakiso Mochochoko, ‘International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance’ in Roy S Lee (ed), The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Statute; Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999) at 305 (describing 
the end result as ‘a balance between the need for perfection on the one hand and States’ concern for certain 
crucial issues on the other’).
37
 Jerry Fowler, ‘Not Fade Away: the International Criminal Court and the State of Sovereignty’ (2001) San 
Diego International law Journal 145, 146.
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The international cooperation and judicial assistance regime encapsulated in Part 9 of the 
Statute is one of the most complex sections of the Rome Statute. The 17 Articles of this Part 
address the interaction between the Court and States in the arrest and transfer of suspects to 
the Court, and in the conduct of investigations or prosecutions by the Court on State territory. 
Not surprisingly, Part 9 is the least ‘supranational’ section of the Statute. Although Article 86 
requires States Parties to ‘cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution 
of crimes,’38 the Articles that follow are riddled with numerous exceptions and 
qualifications.39 Only effective, efficient, prompt and real assistance, and cooperation of states 
will guarantee the viability of the court.40
A. Implementing Legislation
As classically conceived, jurisdiction to enforce concerns rules governing the enforcement of 
law by a State through its courts, as well as through ‘executive’, ‘administrative’, and ‘police 
action’.41  In relation to the envisaged international penal process, the most obvious point is 
that the ICC has no police force.42 Indeed, it was unthinkable to propose one either before or 
during Rome, although there was at least some precedent for doing so.43 But the orders of the 
Court, whether they be arrest warrants, judgments, orders to seize assets, or sentences, will 
need to be enforced. The delegates were not unaware of the problem and many provisions of 
38 Rome Statute, above n 4, art 86.
39 Leila Nadya Sadat & S Richard Carden, ‘The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution’ 
(2000) 88 Georgetown Law Journal 381, 444.
40
 Plachta, above n 6 at 190.
41
 See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1986), 
§401(c).
42
 As one French writer has astutely remarked, the Court represents ‘justice sans police.’ Jean-Eric Schoettl, 
‘Decisions du Conseil Constitutionnel: Cour Penale Internationale’, L’actualite Juridique--Droit Administratif
(20 March 1999) 230.
43
 Leila Sadat Wexler, ‘The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal’, (1996) 29 Cornell 
International Law Journal 665, 673 n 41(discussing the proposed statute of the London International Assembly 
which provided for an international constabulary charged with the ‘execution of the orders of the Court and of 
the Procurator General [of the Court]’).
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the Statute address it directly.44 But virtually all of them are premised on three principles. 
First, the Court will not be permitted to sanction States directly for non-compliance with its 
orders. Rather, the Court will be required to make findings of non-compliance and direct 
those to the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council, in the case of a Security 
Council referral to the Court. Second, the Court may not compel State compliance with its 
orders.45 Third, the personnel of the Court will have no right, in most cases to proceed directly 
to the execution of their duties on the territories of States, but will work through the 
authorities present in the requested State, and will be subject to national law.46  However there 
are exceptional circumstances in which the ICC can take evidence directly on the territory of 
a State Party without having secured the consent of the State Party pursuant to articles 
57(3)(d), 54(3)(d) and 99(4).
Article 57(3)(d) establishes that judicial authorisation for a direct investigation on the territory 
of a State Party may be granted without having secured the cooperation of that State. 
However, this extraordinary power is subject to the condition that the State Party is clearly 
unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the unavailability of any 
authority…competent to execute the request…under Part 9’.47 This article seems to be a 
safety net to facilitate the Court’s activities in failing States where there is no credible legal 
system in place to do it for the Court or in failed States where the State or parts of it may be 
under the occupation and control of a third party for instance a peacekeeping force. Even with 
reliance on the local legal systems of functional States, Article 54(3)(d) provides that the 
Prosecutor may seek cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organisation and may 
44
 See, for example, Rome Statute, above n 4, art 70. 
45
 Sadat & Carden, above n 39 at 415-416.
46
 Ibid.
47 Rome Statute, art 57(3)(d).
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seek a ‘suitable’ arrangement’ with any of them, in accordance with its respective competence 
and/or mandate’.48 Article 99(4) similarly provides the Prosecutor with power to directly 
execute a request that is unencumbered by compulsory measures. This provision was amongst 
the most controversial in the Rome Statute and threatened to create a major political firestorm. 
However, the provision is carefully drafted and will not in practice grant the Prosecutor 
unbridled power rather it seems to rely on tacit State consent. The Prosecutor must enter into 
‘all possible consultations’ with the requested State Party, as well49 considering that an 
entirely hostile or antagonised government will render the authority meaningless.50
In sum, the ICC will rely heavily on the cooperation of States Parties for its success. States 
Parties will be asked to arrest and surrender suspects, investigate and collect evidence, extend 
privileges and immunities to ICC officials, protect witnesses, enforce ICC orders for fines and 
forfeiture and, at times, prosecute those who have committed offences against the 
administration of justice. Key to this cooperation will be domestic legislation permitting the 
State Party to assist the ICC when requested. While States may use different approaches to 
incorporate the same obligation, they do so by meeting the requirements of the Rome Statute. 
The current pace of ratification is steady, with many States adopting comprehensive ICC 
legislation on cooperation. The future of the ICC depends on all States Parties adopting the 
requisite laws that will enable each country to cooperate with the Court. The duty to cooperate 
with the ICC imposed on States Parties by the Rome Statute is twofold: a general commitment 
to cooperate, and an obligation to amend their domestic laws to permit cooperation with the 
Court. 
48
 Ibid art 54(3)(d).
49 Ibid art 99(4)(a)
50
 Annalisa Ciampi, ‘Other Forms of Cooperation’, in Commentary on the Rome Statute, below n 93, Vol II, 
1736-1739.
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Articles 86 and 88 form the foundation of the obligation on States Parties to cooperate with 
the ICC. According to Article 86, ‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.’51 This general requirement is supplemented by the ICC’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence52 that govern specific aspects of cooperation in such 
contexts as the arrest and surrender of individuals and the collection of evidence. Article 88 
obliges States to adopt domestic laws to permit cooperation with the ICC.53
Pursuant to Article 88, a state party has a clear duty to ensure that its national laws provide 
guidelines for handling requests for arrest and surrender, and other forms of cooperation. This 
duty arises even before a state party even receives a request. The insertion of Article 88 in the 
Rome Statute is of central importance because of references to domestic law and procedures 
throughout the Statute.54 States are expected to implement Article 88 in good faith, like any 
other obligation under the Statute through making of legislative changes at the national level.
The obligation to cooperate with the ICC has been actively incorporated through municipal 
mechanisms. States Parties have used several approaches to incorporate the general obligation 
to cooperate. Australia and Switzerland opted to include a general provision in their 
51 Rome Statute, above n 4, art 86.
52
 Finalised draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2 November 
2000).
53
 See Rome Statute, above n 4, art 88. Art 88 provides that ‘States Parties shall ensure that there are procedures 
available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part.’ Ibid.
54 For more detail, see Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection of Evidence: 
Obligations of States (2002) 194-97.
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implementing legislation to cover overall procedures of cooperation.55 Across the Tasman, 
New Zealand added a provision to already existing obligations to give judicial assistance and 
cooperation that extended these obligations to cover the ICC an approach that had initially 
been manifested in Scandinavia through Finland’s implementing legislation.56 Canada 
similarly opted for the mechanism of adding a provision to existing regimes of cooperation to 
encompass the obligations undertaken under the Rome Statute.57 This is but a brief snapshot 
of efforts by States Parties which will be considered in further detail below under specific 
heads dealing with the particular nature of cooperation and assistance.
With the steady pace of the ratification of the Rome Statute, it is heartening to note that States 
continue to pass the domestic laws necessary to cooperate with the ICC. 
Many States have now implemented comprehensive implementing legislation, which includes 
provisions regarding incorporating the ICC crimes as well as cooperation obligations. Some have 
taken the approach of separating implementing legislation into two parts – one for the introduction of 
the crimes and one for the cooperation requirements, reflecting the usual separation between the Code 
of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Crimes, in relation to domestic crimes. …States also need to 
consider whether they will take this opportunity to go beyond the requirements of the Rome Statute, 
which are considered the absolute minimum standards in international law.58
It is very important that all States Parties adopt comprehensive legislation implementing the 
obligations under the Rome Statute as this will allow the Court to begin its work without 
being repeatedly frustrated by States that do not yet have laws in place that allow them to 
55 International Criminal Court Act 2002, Act No 41, 2002, 27 June 2002, Australia, s 3; Federal Law on 
Cooperation with the International Criminal Court (CICCL), 22 June 2001, Switzerland (unofficial translation), 
art 3.
56 International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000, No 26/2000, assented to 6 September 2000, 
New Zealand, s 3, Act on the Implementation of the Provisions of a legislative Nature of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and on the Application of the Statute, No 1284/2000, issued in Helsinki 28 
December 2000, Finland (unofficial translation), s 4.
57 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, C-24, assented to 29 June 2000 entered into force 23 
October 2000, Canada, ss 47-53 and 56-69.
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comply.59 The Article now turns to consider under specific heads the various duties to 
cooperate which the Rome Statute enshrines, the nature and content of the obligations and 
importantly the manner in which States Parties have sought to give effect to the letter and 
spirit of their obligations.
B. Investigation and Evidence Gathering
The aim of the Rome Statute and domestic legislation implementing the Rome Statute is to 
enable the Court’s investigators to conduct thorough investigations as soon as possible after 
the commission of offences. One key element to successful investigations will be the 
willingness of States to provide assistance with investigations in a timely manner. 
Accordingly, a thorough analysis of the utility of domestic legislation will be possible only 
once ICC officials have undertaken an investigation, and the legislation, as well as the State 
Party’s willingness to cooperate with the investigation, are put to the test. Before addressing 
issues of investigations and evidence gathering, however, it is essential to recall that the Rome 
Statute is founded upon the principle of complementarity.60
58
 International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice & International Centre for Human Rights 
and Democratic Development, International Criminal Court: Manual for Ratification and Implementation of the 
Rome Statute (2nd ed, 2003) 14.
59
 See  Valerie Oosterveld et al, ‘How the World Will Relate to the Court: The Cooperation of States with the 
International Criminal Court’ (2002) 25 Fordham International Law Journal 767.
60 Art 17 of the Rome Statute formulates the complementarity regime of the ICC: 
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1, the Court shall determine that a case 
is inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the 
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided 
not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability 
of the State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and 
a trial by the Court is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph 3; 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. 
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Given the status of the ICC--existing within a regime of complementarity--as a court of ‘last resort,’ 
the best form of cooperation that States could provide the Court with would be to ensure that their 
domestic criminal laws: (1) are sufficient to enable thorough investigations of individuals alleged to 
have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, (2) provide for the indictment and trial of 
individuals implicated by evidence of ICC crimes, and (3) are complemented by policies, procedures, 
and practices that support investigative and judicial processes.61
Article 88 of the Rome Statute requires that States Parties ensure the existence of procedures 
under their domestic law that enable them to cooperate with the Court in investigative and 
evidentiary matters.62 This duty exists in addition to the general obligation upon States Parties 
to cooperate fully with the ‘investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court.’63 For the purposes of this section, a distinction must be drawn between 
investigations commenced pursuant to powers of the Court contained within the Rome Statute
and those initiated by the Security Council. Investigations commenced pursuant to the powers 
of the Court are initiated by either States Parties that refer situations to the Court according to 
Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute, or the Prosecutor launching investigations proprio 
motu pursuant to Articles 13(c) and 15. These investigations will be governed by the Rome 
Statute and conducted with the assistance of States Parties mandated by Article 86. States that 
are not parties to the Rome Statute have no prima facie obligation to cooperate with ICC 
investigators.64
The other type of investigation is those triggered by referrals to the ICC by the UN Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Given the Security Council’s over-
arching authority, the referral to the ICC of cases by the Security Council could arguably 
Rome Statute, above n 4, art 17(1). Art 17 of the Rome Statute proceeds to specify the factors the Court must 
consider when determining whether a State is indeed unwilling or unable to proceed. Ibid art 17(2), 17(3).
61
 Oosterveld et al, above n 59 at 775.
62
 See Rome Statute, above n 4, art 88.
63
 Ibid art 86; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UN Doc A/Conf 39/28, UKTS 
58 (1980), 8 ILM 679, art 26.
64
 However, it should be noted that pursuant to art 87(5) of the Rome Statute, the Court may invite a non-Party 
State to provide assistance in an investigation on an ad hoc basis. See Rome Statute, above n 3, art 87(5).
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permit investigators to obtain the assistance of Member States that are not parties to the Rome 
Statute. Taken to the extreme, Security Council referrals would allow the ICC to operate 
under Chapter VII in a manner similar to the ICTFY and the ICTR.65 The Court’s ability to 
obtain the assistance of States in the conducting of such rigorous investigations is mandated 
under Article 54(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, which empowers the Prosecutor to ‘[s]eek the 
cooperation of any State.’66 The Prosecutor is directed to conduct investigations on the 
territory of a State in accordance with the provisions of Part 9.67
Article 93 of the Rome Statute reaffirms the obligation of States Parties to comply with 
requests for assistance from the Court, in accordance with the provisions of Part 9 of the 
Rome Statute and pursuant to their national procedures.68 Part 9 identifies the many precise 
forms of cooperation that States Parties are obliged to provide to the Court, and refers 
specifically to the production of evidence. States Parties are required to facilitate the ICC’s 
requests for assistance in, inter alia, identifying and tracking persons or things;69 taking 
evidence and testimony under oath as well as producing evidence;70 questioning individuals;71
examining places or sites, and exhuming and examining grave sites; executing searches and 
65
 See William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2001) 101, where it is suggested 
that the issues of admissibility criteria and complementarity following a Security Council referral have been left 
(perhaps intentionally) unresolved. See also Jelena Pejic, ‘The International Criminal Court Statute: An 
Appraisal of the Rome Package’ (2000) International Law 65.
66 Rome Statute, above n 4, art 54(3)(c).
67
 See ibid art 54(2)(a). Art 54(2)(b) deals with an exception to the general requirement to obtain a State’s 
cooperation in the conduct of investigations. The subparagraph refers to paragraph 57(3)(d), pursuant to which 
the Pre-Trial Chamber may authorise the Prosecutor to conduct specified investigations on the territory of a State 
Party without that State’s cooperation in situations where the State is ‘clearly unable to execute a request for 
cooperation due to the unavailability of any [State organ] ... competent to execute the request for cooperation 
under Part 9.’ Ibid art 57(3)(d).
68
 Ibid art 93. Art 96 establishes guidelines for the contents of requests. See ibid art 96. Art 99 governs the 
execution of requests ‘in accordance with the relevant provisions under the law of the requested State and, unless 
prohibited by such law, in the manner specified in the request.’ Ibid art 99. Art 100 stipulates that costs, other 
than those exempted by this Article, are to be borne by the requested State. See ibid art 100.
69
 See ibid art 93(1)(a).
70
 See ibid art 93(1)(b).
71
 See ibid art 93(1)(c).
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seizures; effecting the provision of records and documents;72 and guaranteeing the 
preservation of evidence.73 The list of these means of cooperation concludes with a blanket 
clause that obligates States Parties to provide all other types of assistance ‘not prohibited by 
the law of the requested State’ and which will facilitate investigations or prosecutions.74
Bending to sovereignty considerations, conspicuously absent is any subpoena power. That is, 
neither the judges nor the Prosecutor of the ICC (or defence counsel, presumably) appear to 
have any power to compel witnesses to appear.75
As established by this elaboration of relevant provisions, the Rome Statute establishes an 
extensive regime governing the conduct of investigations, the collection of evidence in ICC 
proceedings, and the forms of cooperation required from States Parties to make them 
effective. Until States Parties incorporate their obligations under the Rome Statute to assist the 
Court into their domestic laws and procedures and enable ICC investigations to be conducted 
within their territories, the Prosecutor’s most fundamental efforts to conduct thorough 
investigations in accordance with Article 54 will be stymied. 
The practical ICC legislative initiatives of some of the States that have implemented their 
obligations to cooperate with the ICC in investigations and evidence collection are 
particularly important as examples to States that have yet to ratify and implement the Rome 
Statute.76 Two broad approaches seem to have been followed by states. First, simply adding 
these obligations to the ICC to the list of entities from which the State can entertain request 
72
 See ibid art 93(1)(i).
73
 See ibid art 93(1)(j).
74
 Ibid art 93(1)(l).
75
 Art 93(7) does permit the temporary transfer of persons in custody for purposes of identification or for 
obtaining testimony, however, the State is not required to agree to the transfer, which is subject, in any event, to 
the consent of the person transferred. See Rome Statute, above n 4, art 93(7).
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for assistance and secondly the passage of ICC specific legislation which puts in place the 
necessary administrative and procedural mechanisms for cooperation. A look at the 
implementing legislation of the UK, Canada and Switzerland readily exhibits the character of 
these two approaches.
Canada and the UK adopted single omnibus bill that addresses both the criminal and 
administrative requirements of the ICC.77 The provisions in the Canada Act that amend the 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (‘MLA Act’),78 allow Canada to provide 
assistance to the ICC in investigations and evidence gathering in manners similar to the way 
in which Canada currently provides assistance to States and other entities. The MLA Act not 
only provides the power to assist the ICC with searches and seizures of evidence but also the 
power to order questioning in Canada.79 The UK’s procedural approach in this area largely 
mirrors that of Canada except that the UK specifically enacted legislation to entertain requests 
from the ICC.80 The Swiss approach conforms to the UK approach in so far as it enacted 
specific legislation81 addressing the modes of cooperation with the ICC but does not 
incorporate this through existing laws.82 Instead, Swiss Civil Law establishes a Central 
Authority in the Federal Office of Justice that determines the form and manner in which 
Switzerland will comply with requests for assistance from the ICC.83
76
 See Oosterveld et al, above n 59 for an incisive discussion of the approaches adopted by Canada, UK and 
Switzerland as a template of three different approaches.
77 Canadian Implementing Legislation, above n 57;  International Criminal Court Act 2001 enacted 11 May 
2002, UK, available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts2001/20010017.htm.
78 Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, RSC, ch 30 (1985) (Canada).
79
 Canadian Implementing Legislation, above n 57 at s 18(7).
80
 UK Implementing legislation, above n 77 at ss 27, 33
81 Swiss Implementing Legislation, above n 55.
82 Manual for Ratification and Implementation, above n 58 at 89.
83 Swiss Implementing Legislation, above n 55 at art 3(2)(b).
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C. Arrest and Surrender
Criminal prosecution is inherently tied to notions of national sovereignty and the control over 
persons and territory which are fundamental to that notion. In fact, some argue that the 
Nuremberg tribunal itself succeeded only because it in some ways substituted itself for the 
inability of the German government to try war criminals with the obstacle of sovereignty of 
the German State as a bar to the enforcement of justice having been destroyed by the historic 
events of May and June, 1945. Arguably, the successful establishment of the Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda tribunals represents a fundamental departure from Nuremberg in that the authority 
under which they were constituted derives not from their status as occupied territories, but 
from the exercise of international power by the Security Council.84 More importantly, the ad 
hoc international criminal tribunals establish an international cooperation regime that obliges 
States individually and collectively to arrest and surrender. Like these two bodies, the ICC 
will rely on the goodwill of States in discharging both their legal and discretionary arrest and 
surrender obligations.
The obligation on States Parties to arrest and surrender accused is found in several articles of 
the Rome Statute. The general Article 86 obligation to ‘cooperate fully with the Court in its 
investigation and prosecution of crimes’85 is supplemented by Article 89, which specifically 
addresses ‘surrender of persons to the Court.’86 Under Article 89(1), the Court can transmit a 
request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with material supporting that 
84 Nonetheless, both the Yugoslavia and the Rwanda tribunals were constituted in the midst of continuing 
national disarray, where the functioning national legal system had been subverted and compromised and could 
not be said to reflect basic due process requirements (Yugoslavia) or had collapsed altogether and did not exist 
(Rwanda). It remains to be seen whether the International Criminal Court which will generally operate alongside 
fully operational national legal systems will be able to do without considerable political difficulty.
85 Rome Statute, above n 4, art 86.
86
 Ibid art 89.
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request,87 to a State on the territory of which that person may be found. The Statute is clear as 
to the obligation of States Parties upon receiving such a request: they must comply.88 The 
implementation of a request for arrest and surrender is governed by both Article 59 and the 
relevant provisions of Part 9 of the Statute. Whereas Part 9 contains essentially obligations 
that give effect to the request, Article 59 contains the method of implementation.89 The 
procedure for States Parties to execute requests to arrest and surrender individuals in their 
territories is straightforward: the Court transmits the request together with the supporting 
material required by Article 91 of the Rome Statute. Upon receipt of requests from the ICC, 
States Parties follow their domestic laws, which must be in accordance with the provisions of 
the Rome Statute. Rule 184 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence stipulates that requested 
States must immediately inform the ICC’s Registrar in the event persons under indictment of 
87
 See ibid art 89(1). Art 91 outlines the kind of written material that must accompany the request for arrest and 
surrender. 
In the case of a request for the arrest and surrender of a person for whom a warrant of arrest has been 
issued by the [ICC’s] Pre-Trial Chamber ... the request shall contain or be supported by: 
(a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the person, and information as to 
that person’s probable location; 
(b) A copy of the warrant of arrest; and 
(c) Such documents, statements or information as may be necessary to meet the requirements for the 
surrender process in the requested State. 
Ibid art 91(2). In the case of a person already convicted by the ICC but who has escaped, the request 
must contain: 
(a) A copy of any warrant for arrest of that person; 
(b) A copy of the judgement of conviction; 
(c) Information to demonstrate that the person sought is the one referred to in the judgement of
conviction; and 
(d) If the person sought has been sentenced, a copy of the sentence imposed and, in the case of a 




 See ibid art 89(1) (‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure under 
their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.’).
89 Rome Statute, above n 4, art 59. Furthermore, art 55(2) applies to the Prosecutor or national authorities’ 
questioning of an individual, pursuant to a request made under Part 9. It also applies to hearings connected with 
the art 59 arrest proceedings. As a result, the arrested person is entitled to remain silent, to have legal assistance 
of his choosing and to be questioned in the presence of counsel. In particular, this last right is not obvious in 
several civil law jurisdictions with respect to extradition related interrogations.
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the Court are available for surrender.90 States and the Registrar must agree on the date and 
manner of the surrender.91 However as straightforward as these provisions appear, they were 
the result of serious debate and compromise.
1. Arrest
In the overwhelming majority of cases, national authorities must arrest the person before they 
surrender the person for the purpose of prosecution.92 Article 58 regulates the issuance of an 
arrest warrant. The Pre-Trial Chamber is designated to issue arrest warrants.93 Here, the 
Statute is consistent with international human rights instruments and the practice in many 
national criminal jurisdictions because judicial intervention is required to deprive a person of 
his or her liberty.94
As in many national criminal jurisdictions, the conditions under which the Pre-Trial Chamber 
must issue an arrest warrant are twofold. First, the prosecutor must show there are ‘reasonable 
grounds’ to believe the person concerned committed a crime within the court’s jurisdiction.95
Second, the person must be arrested for a specific purpose.96 The Rome Statute’s conditions 
for the issuance of an arrest warrant are stricter than the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. The latter 
instruments, or the applicable Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not contain the condition 
90
 See ICC Rules, above n 52, rule 184.
91
 Ibid.
92 Even when the individual is already detained, an arrest warrant by the ICC should be issued to ensure his 
continued detention in a form of constructive custody. Art 58(7) authorizes the issuance of a summons to appear 
when a summons is sufficient to ensure the person’s appearance. Rome Statute, above n 3 at 44.
93 For a more thorough analysis of the role and powers of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, see Olivier Fourmy, 
‘Powers of the Pre-Trial Chambers’ in Antonio Cassese et al (eds) The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) Vol I, 1207-30.
94 That arrests in the absence of a warrant do not take place ‘in accordance with the law’ and thus amount to 
arbitrary arrest is consistent with international human rights jurisprudence. See, eg, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/69/D/770/1997, UN GAOR, 69th Sess, Supp No 40, Annex 9, at 172-77; see also UN Doc A/55/40 
(2000) (discussing the Human Rights Committee’s supervision of the states’ observance of the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights).
95 Rome Statute, above 4, art 58(1)(a).
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of necessity. 97 Pursuant to Article 58(1)(a), the Prosecutor must meet the burden of proving 
‘reasonable grounds.’ Although the ‘reasonable grounds’ standard is the minimum standard 
under Article 58, the actual standard applied by the Pre-Trial Chamber, however, may be 
more demanding. Article 58(1)(b) further lists three alternative purposes that the arrest should 
serve. These include  ensuring the person’s appearance at trial (since trial there can be no trial 
in absentia), prevent interference with investigations and to prevent further or continuing 
commission of an offence within the Court’s jurisdiction.98
Certain provisions of the Rome Statute governing arrest and surrender are directly related to 
the actions States Parties must undertake in specific circumstances. These situations include 
procedures for arrest and surrender as well as provisional arrest, challenges by an accused or a 
State of the admissibility or jurisdiction of the Court, the actual surrender of individuals and 
their transit through the territories of States Parties, and instances of competing requests for 
arrest and surrender. Although States Parties will be required to adapt their national law to 
ensure that they are able to fulfil their cooperation obligations under the Statute,99 a 
significant residual role remains for national law which will continue to control the form and 
procedure governing requests for assistance,100 as well as the execution of such requests, with 
very limited exceptions.101
96 Ibid.
97 The ICTY and ICTR arrest procedures are based on the questionable assumption that a certain level of proof 
that an individual has committed crimes within the Tribunals’ jurisdiction is sufficient grounds for arrest. The 
apparent irrelevance of this condition derives from the ICTR’s Rule 65, according to which an accused must 
prove exceptional circumstances to obtain a judicial order for provisional release. From the perspective of human 
rights, the reverse situation is far more appropriate. The ICTY Judges have amended Rule 65 by removing the 
exceptional circumstances requirement.
98 Rome Statute, above n 4, art 58(1)(b).
99
 Ibid art 88.
100
 See, eg, ibid arts 91(2)(c), 96(2)(e), 99(1).
101
 One such exception is art 99(4)(a), which permits the Prosecutor to execute requests that can be performed 
without any compulsory measures directly on the territory of a State Party if the State is one on the territory that 
the crime is alleged to have been committed and there has been a determination of admissibility in the case.  
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During the negotiation of the Rome Statute, States disagreed as to the process that should be 
used to arrest and bring persons before the Court. The term ‘arrest’ raised the question as to 
whether States could use their national custodial powers or would need to follow ICC-specific 
arrest procedures to take individuals into custody. This question was linked to the issue of 
cooperation more generally: for some, national laws varied so much that use of those laws 
could conceivably limit the Court’s ability to discharge its basic functions, whereas for others, 
any derogation from their national laws would be deemed unacceptable as an invasion of 
sovereignty.102 Article 58(5) of the Rome Statute connects the issuance of the arrest warrant 
with the issuance of a request for arrest and surrender to a state. According to this provision, 
the court may issue such a request under Part 9, only after an arrest warrant has been issued 
under Article 58.103 Part 9 contains the regulations and conditions pertaining to the issuance 
and transmission of requests for an arrest and surrender, with one important exception: the 
provisions under Part 9 are procedural.
The procedural requirements are set out in Articles 87 and 91 of the Statute. Sections 1 and 2 
of Article 87 contain regulations on the channel of communications and the choice of 
languages regarding requests for assistance. According to Article 87(1)(a), requests for 
assistance shall be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or any other appropriate 
channel designated by each state party. The language of the request shall be in the official 
language of the requested state or one of the court’s working languages, as the state party 
102
 See Mochochoko, above n 36 at  308.
103 The power to issue requests for assistance is attributed to the court as a whole, including all of its organs. Part 
9 does not specify the organ empowered to request the arrest and surrender. It appears self-evident, however, that 
the Pre-Trial Chamber remains the competent organ in this respect.
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chooses.104 These regulations are similar to those in the Inter-State Cooperation Model.105 It is 
clearly a concession to states in favour of a more horizontal oriented cooperation model.106
2. Surrender
At Rome, in the face of serious concerns with regard to sovereignty, the crucial point was to 
decide whether or not arrest and delivery of suspects would be carried out within the 
framework of extradition or rather a new method had to be worked out. Some countries 
argued for a simple transfer mechanism, where they could send a person to the ICC with little 
or no domestic process. Other countries fearful of granting too many concessions to the Court 
argued for the use of extradition, especially to transfer nationals. A majority of countries, 
however, argued for a sui generis approach.  ‘The Polish delegation suggested that a more 
structured and a better methodological approach be adopted towards this problem that would 
reflect what the Roman jurists had taught a couple of thousand years earlier: bene docet qui 
bene distinguit.’107 It was recommended that the solution should include the following steps: 
1. to distinguish clearly between extradition and surrender by pointing to fundamental differences 
between them 
2. to define surrender as a genuine and unique form of cooperation between States and the 
International Criminal Court; and 
3. to frame this form accordingly by specifying its constituent elements with due consideration to the 
specific nature, organisation, and jurisdiction as well as the needs of the ICC.108
‘From the outset, it was obvious that broadly speaking there [were] two options to solve this 
problem: either to maintain extradition (straight [“regular”] or somewhat modified) or to 
104 Some thirty states have lodged a declaration under art 87(2) of the Statute concerning the choice of languages. 
Concerning those states which have not done so, they will receive requests for assistance in one of the working 
languages of the court, English or French. 
105 See, eg, European Convention on Extradition, 13 December 1957, Europ T S No 24 at 7, 9.
106 See Claus Kress & Kimberly Prost, ‘Article 87’ in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
The International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article By Article (1999) 1057-58.
107
 Plachta, above n 6 at 191.
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create a new form of delivery of a “body of a criminal,” different and separate from 
extradition.’109 States eventually agreed to a compromise under which the Rome Statute
would refer both to specific obligations for arrest and surrender and acknowledge procedures 
in existence under domestic laws.110 The solution adopted was to oblige States to ‘surrender’ 
persons to the Court, with the procedure to be followed left to the individual States, subject to 
certain limitations.111 The compromise is reflected in Article 102 which states that for the 
purposes of the Statute, ‘surrender’ means the delivering up of a person by a State to the 
Court, pursuant to this Statute, whereas ‘extradition’ means the delivering up of a person by 
one State to another as provided by treaty, convention, or national legislation.112 Thus 
‘surrender’ as a process through which States turn over individuals to the ICC is a process 
quite different from extradition, which takes place only between States. It is significant that 
States agreed to create a process for the ICC that is more streamlined than State-to-State 
extradition.113  Accordingly, under Article 91(2)(c) of the Rome Statute, the procedural 
requirements imposed by States for the surrender of persons to the ICC: 
should not be more burdensome than those applicable to requests for extradition pursuant to treaties or 
arrangements between the requested State and other States and should, if possible, be less 
burdensome, taking into account the distinct nature of the Court.114
108
 See Franco Mosconi & Nicoletta Parisi, ‘Co-operation Between International Criminal Court and States 
Parties’ in The International Criminal Court: Comments On The Draft Statute (1998) 313-16 (attempting to 
distinguish between ‘extradition’ and ‘surrender’ in the context of the ICC).
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 Plachta, above n 6 at 190.
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 See Rome Statute, above n 4, art 102 (defining ‘surrender’ and ‘extradition’ in context of ICC).
111
 In order to ensure that there was no confusion between the terms ‘surrender’ and ‘extradition,’ Art 102 was 
included in the Rome Statute, providing definitions for both. See ibid art 102. According to Art 102, ‘‘surrender’ 
means the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court ....’ and ‘‘extradition’ means the delivering up of a 
person by one State to another as provided by treaty, convention or national legislation.’ Ibid.
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 See Rome Statute, above n 4, art 102 (defining ‘surrender’ and ‘extradition’ in context of ICC).
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‘The main intent of this exercise was to free the ‘surrender’ from a host of conditions, 
restrictions, and requirements which, developed in other epochs and designed for different 
purposes, are inappropriate in the context of the ICC. Exceptions, exclusions, and exemptions 
traditionally have been the main obstacle to make extradition a fully effective tool in the fight
against crime. To strengthen ‘surrender’ and render it more efficient, the number and scope of 
grounds for refusal by the requested State had to be significantly restricted. … by removing 
from the Statute ALL grounds for refusal of ‘surrender.’115 If we accept that the provisions 
pertaining to surrender have in fact removed all possible grounds for refusal, then we would 
have to conclude that the authorities of the requested State, being unable to invoke any bar to 
‘surrender’ or ‘transfer,’ are placed in an awkward position of either violating their domestic 
law or violating their international obligation. That would also mean that the principle aut 
dedere aut judicare has been replaced with by a mandatory requirement of transfer 
(dedere).116
Certain complications are raised by the ‘surrender’ regime under the Rome Statute. Most 
significant is the complication of constitutional prohibitions on extradition of nationals to a 
foreign jurisdiction that are to be found in many constitutions. The question is whether such 
prohibitions are consistent with the obligation of State Parties to surrender suspects to the 
ICC. Because the ICC will not prosecute in absentia, the Court must gain physical control 
over a suspect for a trial to take place. The apparent tension between constitutional 
prohibitions against extradition of nationals and ICC obligations diminishes upon a closer 
examination of the fundamental conceptual differences between ‘surrender’ to an 
115
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international criminal court and ‘extradition’ to another State.117 Article 102 of the Statute 
defines ‘surrender’ as ‘the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court’ and extradition as 
‘the delivering up of a person by one State to another.’118 This distinction between extradition 
and surrender is not merely semantic but substantive.
In common law countries, the possibility of surrendering nationals to the ICC does not 
necessitate adoption of any particular legislative measures other than the one that would 
facilitate the surrender of the individual to the ICC. It is with civil law countries that a real 
problem emerges since most of these countries contain constitutional prohibitions against 
extradition of nationals. However, it is worthy of note that the creators of such constitutional 
prohibitions contemplated ‘horizontal cooperation’ between national courts and not ‘vertical 
cooperation’ with an international court. As the ICC is not a ‘foreign court’ or ‘foreign 
jurisdiction,’ but rather an international one, the constitutional prohibitions against extradition 
may not apply. Given the flexibility provided by the Rome Statute, States have two options 
when implementing the obligation to surrender individuals to the ICC: create a separate legal 
procedure or amend existing extradition laws. 
Many States have had to pass new laws or adapt existing national laws in order to provide 
clear authority for surrendering fugitives to the ICC. The adaptation of national law in order 
to transfer nationals to the ICC proved much more complicated in a great number of States 
because most of the constitutions--except those of the Anglo-American system--contain a 
prohibition against the extradition of nationals. 
117
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Civil law countries have opted for three approaches (1) amending the constitution, (2) 
adopting an interpretative approach and (3) a general, centralized model that favours 
procedural mechanisms. In the first approach, reflected by Germany, States have effected 
minor amendments ‘aimed only at including an exception to the principle, to ensure that the 
Constitution is not breached by the surrender of a national to the ICC. The advantage of a 
constitutional amendment with a specific reference to the ICC is that it erases any possibility 
of a normative conflict at the national level.’119 In the second approach, States such as Costa 
Rica, Ecuador and Ukraine have largely interpreted the Constitutional prohibition against 
extradition of one’s own national in light of the need to conform to international law 
considering that the ICC represents the international community and is established with their 
consent.120 The third approach is manifest in Swiss Civil Law.121 The law establishes a Central 
Authority in the Federal Office of Justice which handles all ICC requests for cooperation and 
requests for surrender.122 The Central Authority is administered through the Federal Office of 
Justice, to which responsibility is delegated to, inter alia, surrender to the Court persons being 
prosecuted and transmit the results of the execution of the request.123 Article 5 of the Swiss 
Civil Law mandates that cantonal and federal authorities perform all measures ordered by the 
Central Authority to cooperate with the Court and the means prescribed by the Central 
Authority to implement requests from the ICC must be executed expeditiously without being 
118 Rome Statute, above n 4 at art 102.
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subjected to the substantive procedures of the designated cantonal or federal authority.124
Virtually no restriction exists as to the means by which requests are conveyed.
Summing up the approach by civil law countries, most Continental Europe civil law countries 
provide for minimal judicial involvement of domestic courts. Generally, once a person 
resident in the State against whom an indictment has been confirmed has been taken into 
custody and informed of the charges against him/her by the examining court, transfer to the 
ICC shall be approved without the need for formal extradition proceedings and without any 
need to conduct proceedings and invoke the substantive requirements often specified by 
domestic laws on extradition. Even in States where courts may be consulted concerning 
requests for transfer, the degree of judicial review ranges simply from perfunctory 
identification of suspects to limited evidentiary review. 
Surprisingly, it is Anglo-American countries that are keen to ensure that ‘surrender’ requests 
from the ICC are subjected to certain domestic safeguards. For instance in the UK more 
extensive examination is required by law, which contemplates extradition-like proceedings in 
courts. The surrender provisions of the UK Act reads to some extent like a streamlined 
bilateral albeit one that enables surrender in only one direction: from the UK to the ICC.125
The process implemented by the UK Act is based on legislation originally drafted for the swift 
transfer of suspects between the United Kingdom and Ireland, which became the model for 
the arrest and surrender of suspects to the ICTY and ICTR.126 Warrant applications brought 
by constables will include statements under oath that they have reason to believe that a 
124 Ibid art 5.
125 See UK Act, above n 77 at pt 2.
126 See Council of Europe, Progress Report by the United Kingdom 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.legal.coe.int/criminal/icc/docs/Consult_ ICC(2001)/ConsultICC(2001)31E.pdf
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request for arrest has been made by the ICC and that the person is in, or en route to, the 
United Kingdom. Upon the successful bringing of an application, an appropriate judicial 
officer shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the person identified in the warrant127 and notify 
the Secretary of State. A ‘reasonable basis’ (comparable to ‘probable cause,’ the evidentiary 
standard in UK courts) standard must be satisfied before extradition requests may be certified. 
The UK is not alone in clinging to some form of domestic safeguard. In Canada, the Canada 
Act addresses arrest and surrender by amending the Extradition Act128 to include a separate 
procedure for the surrender of persons to the ICC, which is, in essence, a shortened, modified 
version of the extradition process. This approach, as opposed to creating a sui generis
procedure, was taken as the Extradition Act had been amended one year earlier to include 
surrender to the ICTFY129 and the ICTR.130 In addition, Canada’s extradition process has 
passed constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court, and the creation of a streamlined 
surrender process for the ICC within existing Canadian extradition law is more likely to 
accord with established constitutional standards.131 This surrender process for the ICC was 
created through several amendments to the Extradition Act. Similarly other common law 
countries for instance Australia and New Zealand provide for surrender determinations to be 
127 See UK Act, above n 77 s 3(3) addresses applications that should be made in Scotland.
128 Extradition Act, SC, ch 18 (1999) (Canada).
129 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc S/RES/827 
(1993), amended by UN Doc S/RES/1166 (1998); UN Doc S/RES/1329 (2000).
130 Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states, 
between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994), amended by UN Doc 
S/RES/1165 (1998); UN Doc S/RES/1329 (2000).
131 See, e.g., Canada v Schmidt, [1987] 1 SCR 500; Kindler v Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 SCR 779; 
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made by the Attorney-General who, in both countries, has discretion to refuse requests in 
‘special’ (Australia) or ‘exceptional’ (New Zealand) ‘circumstances.’132
Whether the significant new regime of ‘surrender’ would be successful depends first and 
foremost on the reaction of States, governments, and their national legislatures to the concept 
of ‘surrender.’ It is heartening to note that many States both common and civil law regard 
‘surrender’ as a genuine, per se form of delivering up the requested persons to the ICC and 
have convinced their parliaments to adopt the relevant national law and to amend the existing 
statutes. Article 102 seems poised to be a great success.
3.Transit on Third Party Territory
In pushing back the barriers of sovereignty, the Rome Statute and ICC’s Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence oblige States to take certain action with regard to arresting persons and 
surrendering them to the Court. Accordingly, States must be able to cooperate with the ICC in 
these areas in order to ensure an effective Court through the enactment of ICC specific 
national legislation. 
The Rome Statute provides for the practical reality that, on many occasions, persons being 
surrendered to the Court cannot be taken directly from their points of arrest to the ICC’s 
detention facilities in The Hague without transiting through one or more States. If transit 
through the territory of a State Party is required, under Article 89(3), that State Party must 
authorize, in accordance with its domestic law and procedures, transportation of the person, 
132
 Australia Implementing legislation, above n 55; New Zealand Implementing legislation, above n 56.
36
unless transit through the State would impede or delay surrender.133 The person being 
transported must be detained in custody during the entirety of the transit process. The Court 
will need to seek voluntary cooperation for transiting persons through the territories of non-
States Parties, as the Rome Statute does not bind them.
Considering that many States do not have legislation permitting the detention of a person 
being transported, implementing legislation needs to come in once again to smooth the way. 
The Manual for Ratification and Implementation identifies two mechanisms seen in existing 
legislation: (1) amendment of existing domestic legislation and  (2) establishment of a 
separate regime in implementing legislation134
The first approach is manifest in Canadian legislation which amends domestic legislation to 
ensure compliance with Article 89.135 Australia and New Zealand fall in the second category 
with provisions which mirror Article 89.136 The Manual for Ratification and Implementation
identifies that the provisions in the New Zealand legislation incorporate the obligations set out 
in Article 89 and include self-contained procedures in dealing with persons in transit.137 The 
Australian and UK legislation largely mirror the provisions in the New Zealand legislation. 
However, the UK legislation treats the request as though they were ordinary requests for 
arrest and surrender except that the circumstances render this to be an expedited process.138
133 See Rome Statute, above n 4 art 89(3). However, under art 89(3)(d), no authorisation is required if the 
arrested person is transported by air and no landing is scheduled on the territory of the transit State. See id.
134 Manual for Ratification and Implementation, above n 58at 84.
135 Extradition Act, SC 1999, c C-18, assented to 17 June 1999, amendments concerning the International 
Criminal Court entered into force on 23 October 2000. See the brief analysis in the Manual for Ratification and 
Implementation, above n 36 at 84.
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4. Competing Requests
A complication relates to competing requests between the Court and States. In contrast to the 
ad hoc tribunals, the ICC does not take priority over other international obligations, such as 
that provided for in Article 103 of the UN Charter. Article 90 on ‘competing requests’ 
addresses the possibility that a State Party (the requested State) might receive a request from 
the ICC and from a State not Party to the Statute (the requesting State) for surrender of the 
same person.139 Requests are ‘competing’ if fulfilling one would prevent a State from 
fulfilling the other: a State cannot simultaneously extradite a person to another State and 
surrender that same person to the ICC. Despite the potential for a State to receive mutually 
exclusive requests along these lines, not all competition is deemed problematic under Article 
90. ‘In particular, certain apparently mutually exclusive requests may in fact come under the 
heading of “false competitions”--that is, situations involving no real conflict among a 
requested State’s existing obligations, and thus no real competition.’140
Simultaneous requests by the ICC and a requesting State may create a true competition if and 
when the ICC determines that the case is admissible. If extradition of an individual to the 
requesting State and surrender to the ICC are not sought for the same conduct, then the ICC’s 
request has priority if the requested State has no existing international obligation to extradite 
the person to the requesting State (a false competition).141 If extradition and surrender are 
139 Rome Statute, above n 3, art 102 on ‘Use of terms’ stipulates: (a) ‘surrender’ means the delivering up of a 
person by a State to the Court, pursuant to this Statute; (b) ‘extradition’ means the delivering up of a person by 
one State to another as provided by treaty, convention, or national legislation. Observers’ Notes, Article By 
Article above n 106 at 1016. Since the ICC is not a foreign jurisdiction, surrender procedures must be no more 
burdensome and should, if possible, be less burdensome than those applicable to requests for extradition ‘taking 
into account the distinct nature of the Court.’ Ibid art 91(2)(c), see Observers’ Notes, Article By Article, ibid 
1054.
140
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sought for the same conduct (a true competition), then the requested State must make a 
decision based on factors included but not limited to those enumerated in Article 90, ‘but [the 
requested State] shall give special consideration to the relative nature and gravity of the 
conduct in question.’142 The goal of the regime set out in Article 90 is not to ensure that all 
persons responsible for international crimes are tried before the ICC. Rather, it is to ensure 
that they are tried before a competent court and are subject to protections and penalties that 
meet international standards. 
D. Enforcement of the Duty to Cooperate
Article 87 of the Rome Statute sets out the general provisions governing requests by the ICC 
for cooperation with investigations and includes recourse for the Court in the event that States 
Parties fail to comply with its requests. Upon a finding by the Court of failure by a State Party 
to cooperate, the dispute may be referred to either the Assembly of States Parties or to the UN 
Security Council for resolution.143 Similar to requests for arrest and surrender, the terms of the 
Rome Statute mandating cooperation with the Court in a general capacity are equally relevant 
to demands for cooperation in investigations and for the collection of evidence. Article 87(7) 
confirms the ICC’s power to issue judicial findings for disputes over the extent of the duty to 
cooperate.144
Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, a clear process exists for inducing a party 
state’s compliance with a request for assistance. The ICC may make a judicial finding of non-
142
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compliance where a party state fails to comply with a request to cooperate with the ICC. 
Commenting on the efficacy of such a finding, Dr Goran Sluiter observes that:
A judicial finding of non-cooperation is dual in character. It is an enforcement measure. As such, the 
impact of an impartial international judicial body establishing that a state has breached its obligations 
under an international treaty should not be underestimated. Such a finding, establishing a non-
cooperating state’s illegal actions, may induce its compliance. Second, a judicial finding of non-
compliance satisfies the vital prerequisite to submit the matter to those institutional bodies designated 
to enforce the Statute.145
Article 95 of the Rome Statute however allows a state to postpone the execution of a request 
pending the determination by the court of the case’s admissibility pursuant to Article 18 or 19 
of the Statute. The provision puts the principle of complementarity into effect. According to 
this principle, prosecution should take place at the national level and the court may only 
exercise jurisdiction if a state is unwilling or unable to prosecute a case. According to Article 
95, until it is certain that the court may actually exercise jurisdiction, there is no need to assist 
the court.
Though the Rome Statute expressly allows the requested state to postpone the provision of 
legal assistance under certain conditions, this is not the same as a ground for refusing 
assistance. ‘The latter, if accepted by the court, is final. The former, however, may 
temporarily suspend the duty to provide assistance. It regains its force when the “conditions 
of postponement” are no longer applicable. The difference between refusal and postponement 
may only be marginal in practice, particularly if it concerns a request that begs for swift 
execution.’146 The main ground for refusal addresses the right to postpone legal services but 
in extrapolation, the ground for postponement has a significant positive effect for effective 
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legal assistance generally in that it underlines that the “general rule” is immediate execution 
of requests, and postponement is the exception.147
E. Immunity & Exclusive Jurisdiction
Article 98, entitled ‘Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to 
surrender,’ has proved to be a battleground between States that seek to limit the ICC’s 
freedom of action and States (notably the US) that seek to affirm the superiority of sovereign 
consent. Article 98 of the Rome Statute, provides that the court may not proceed with a 
request for surrender or assistance that would require the requested state to act inconsistently 
with its obligations under international law. The state must respect a third state’s diplomatic 
immunity. ‘Article 98 of the Rome Statute, as a ground to refuse assistance, recognises 
protections flowing from international obligations relating to diplomatic or state immunity. 
Additionally, it recognises those obligations arising from an agreement, such as Status of 
Forces agreements. These latter agreements provide exclusive jurisdiction over troops 
stationed in another state.’148
In particular, Article 98(1) contemplates a situation in which the ICC seeks surrender or 
assistance that ‘would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations 
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or 
property of a third State.’149 Article 98(2) addresses a special instance of true competition: a 
situation in which a request for surrender from the ICC overlaps with a pre-existing obligation 
147 See Rome Statute, above n 3 at 73 (referring to immediate execution).
148
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that the requested State has under an international agreement with a third State to ‘extradite’ 
or ‘surrender’ individuals to the sending State. More specifically, Article 98(2) envisages the 
possibility that a member of a non-State Party’s armed forces present in the territory of a State 
Party might be subject to a request for surrender by the ICC that conflicts with the requested 
State’s treaty obligation not to extradite the person under a State-to-State agreement, typically 
a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA), between the requested State and the non-State Party. 150
‘Although the United States supports the ideals embodied in the Rome Statute, it [was] 
determined to obtain an exemption from the Court’s jurisdiction for members of its armed 
forces and officials. During the closing hours of the Rome Conference, delegates 
overwhelmingly voted down US amendments to the Statute to secure this exemption. The 
United States [felt] vulnerable to political attack through the Court because of its military 
deployment across the globe and its international role as peacekeeper.’151 At Rome, the US 
delegation sought to address these concerns and shield US military personnel from the 
Court’s jurisdiction. The delegation scored a major triumph with the successful negotiation of 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute.152 Article 98(2) states: 
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a 
sending State required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain 
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.153
150
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The article aims to restrict the ICC’s power to indict and try military personnel by codifying a 
certain deference to State-to-State agreements such as SOFAs and extradition treaties.154 The 
use of Article 98 as a likely ground to restrict the ICC was soon at the centre of the US 
campaign to ensure its nationals remain beyond the reach of the ICC. Soon after the 
conclusion of the Rome Conference and the adoption of the Rome Statute,
The United States saw the drafting of the Rules of Procedure as a potential opening for continued 
attempts to ensure that no US citizen could be haled before the ICC for crimes committed on the 
territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute. In particular, the US delegation focused on article 98(2) 
as a hook for an expanded interpretation of what kinds of “international agreements” might act as 
limits on the ICC’s ability to request the surrender of an individual, without first attempting to secure 
the consent of that person’s State of citizenship.155
The US proposed a rule that read as follows: “The Court shall proceed with a request for 
surrender or an acceptance of a person into the custody of the Court only in a manner 
consistent with international agreements applicable to the surrender of the person.”156 Peeling 
back the legal façade of the proposal, Dr Chimene Keitner, astutely observes that:
This underlying agenda or “fundamental requirement” was, and remains, obtaining a guarantee that no 
US citizen will be subject to ICC jurisdiction under any circumstances as long as the US remains a 
non-Party to the Rome Statute. As part of an exemption strategy, the US proposed rule is inconsistent 
with the intended scope of article 98(2), and with the spirit of the Rome Statute. Exempting the 
nationals of any country from the jurisdiction of the ICC stands in fundamental opposition to the 
ideals of international justice and to the affirmation of universal jurisdiction over the most serious 
international crimes.157
Eventually a modified version of the US rule was adopted by the Fifth PrepCom as rule 
195(2) in the Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It is important to 
note that ‘The discussions of rule 195(2) during the Fifth PrepCom served to clarify the 
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nature, scope, and purpose of article 98(2), an article that had not previously been a focus of 
attention.’158
States can however take unilateral steps in relation to the protections that SOFAs already 
provide consistent with the treaty including re-opening SOFAs to accomplish this objective. 
‘Article 98 places international treaty obligations in a position superior to requests or orders 
from the Court for surrender or delivery of a suspect. As a result, states can intentionally 
create international obligations that compete or conflict with the Court’s request for surrender 
for the sole purpose of avoiding its jurisdiction. Effectively, Article 98 supports current 
treaties and allows for the negotiation of future treaties or international agreements that would 
secure a state’s jurisdiction over its citizens to supersede ICC jurisdiction.’159 There is a 
strong argument though by treaty proponents that ICC jurisdiction is a freestanding, 
independent right and that the Receiving State can exercise its own discretion by transferring 
persons to the ICC, even in the face of a SOFA provision.160 This is echoed by Dr Chimene 
Keitner who identifies an important bulwark against any bad faith efforts by noting that:
The rule [195(2)] to article 98(2) is consistent with the Statute as long as it is read strictly in 
conjunction with the article itself, and with the prevailing understanding of the nature of the 
agreements at issue accepted at Rome and clarified during the PrepCom (that is, agreements between 
the sending State and the requested State, creating an international obligation on the requested 
State).161
However when the United States delegation successfully negotiated the inclusion of the Rule 
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applicability.162 Thus Article 98(2) contains arguments waiting to be plucked by States into 
their SOFAs and ensure that their service members are not surrendered to the Court.163 The 
US determination to use Article 98(2) towards political as opposed to legal imperatives was 
soon manifest. On 30 June 2002, the United States vetoed a six-month extension of the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.164 This veto blocked a resolution supported by thirteen of the 
fifteen members of the Security Council. As a result, members of the Security Council 
acquiesced to the US request and granted all peacekeepers from States not parties to the Rome 
Statute participating in the Bosnia mission blanket protection from ICC prosecution for one 
year.165
Although article 98(2) seems to codify a certain deference to State-to-State agreements such 
as SOFAs, which are drafted and adopted to facilitate military operations by one State in the 
territory of another, the Article is far more comprehensive viewed in its context as well as 
broader international law. ‘The reference to the third State in this scenario as the “sending 
State” (as opposed to “State not Party to this Statute,” the term used in the other provisions of 
Part 9) indicates that the drafters of the Rome Statute were concerned with a particular 
scenario in article 98: the possible interference by the ICC with operations conducted by the 
armed forces or personnel of a non- State Party in the territory of a State Party. Note, 
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however, that this “interference” would presumably consist of deterrence, investigation, and, 
if necessary, prosecution of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in cases 
where the sending State or the requested State was itself unwilling or unable to investigate or 
prosecute.’166 Thus a literal reading suggests that objections to jurisdiction on any basis other 
than the requested State’s own willingness to investigate and prosecute the crimes in question 
constitute a breach of the requested State’s existing obligations under international law.167
Under the ICC regime, the deployment of a non-State Party’s troops on the territory of a State
Party would continue to be governed by existing agreements under which the 
sending/contributing State retains criminal jurisdiction over its own soldiers on such 
missions.168 However, as Dr Chimene Keitner notes: ‘This arrangement is a feature of, not a 
limit on, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction: the ICC would only request cooperation or 
surrender of a person if those States also possessing jurisdiction proved unwilling or unable to 
exercise it.’169 The end result thus appears to be that military personnel will be free from ICC 
prosecution so long as their State of origin investigates and properly prosecutes any potential 
crimes they may have committed. On the negative side, past history points to a string of 
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failures by sending states to investigate alleged war crimes by its military personnel serving in 
peacekeeping missions.170
Currently the United States is pursuing a policy of negotiating treaties with each ICC member 
state to grant immunity to US military personnel. The Bush Administration is intent on 
continuing such a policy even in the face of bitter opposition by the European Union.171 In 
sum,
The ‘fundamental objective’ of the US in the ICC negotiations [was] and remains, ‘to prevent, unless 
certain conditions are met, the surrender to or acceptance by the ICC for trial of nationals of non-party 
States who are acting under governmental direction and whose actions are acknowledged as such by 
the non-party State.’ This sought-after exemption would even preclude a non-party national from 
surrendering voluntarily to the ICC, an unprecedented restriction on the possibility of self-
surrender.172
However, reality is not as simple as the US rationale and the agreements might seem to 
suggest. It is the very thing that the US seeks to safeguard that ultimately stands in the way-
sovereignty. The principle of territorial sovereignty or territorial supremacy establishes that a 
State has ‘exclusive competence to take legal and factual measures within a territory and 
prohibit foreign governments from exercising authority in the same area without consent.’173
In Wilson v Girard174 the US Supreme Court citing The Schooner Exchange v McFadden
held, ‘a sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offences against its laws 
committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its 
jurisdiction.’ Recent state practice shows that States are keen to retain jurisdictional 
prerogative whether pursuant to domestic or to international obligations. For instance in 
170
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Humanitarian Law Violations of the ‘Blue Helmets’. (2000) 5 Deakin Law Review 47.
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Netherlands v Short,175 an American soldier charged with murder was only released to US 
authorities upon an undertaking that he would not be subject him to the death penalty since 
such an action would violate the Dutch court’s responsibilities under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.176 It is not hard then to picture that a State Party to the ICC 
even in the face of a SOFA has obligations under the Rome Statute grounded in international 
law that would override a SOFAs which simply seeks to circumvent the ICC.177
F. Enforcement of Forfeiture Orders and ICC Fines
The Rome Statute enables the ICC to issue orders for the forfeiture of property considered to 
be derived from crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. In order to effect forfeiture, the Court is 
also empowered to issue orders freezing assets that are the proceeds of crime178 located within 
the territories of States Parties. The Rome Statute also permits orders for the forfeiture of 
individuals’ property derived from crime179 to be imposed as part of the sentence, either in 
and of themselves or in addition to prison terms, that may be imposed by the Court on 
individuals convicted of crimes within its jurisdiction.180 Finally, in terms of enforcement of 
the Court’s financial punitive powers, the ICC represents an innovation in international 
criminal sanction as the first-ever international tribunal explicitly empowered to impose 
fines181 against individuals.182 All of these important powers of the criminal judicial process 
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allotted to the Court by the Rome Statute must be affirmed nationally by its States Parties in 
order to be enforceable and thereby have an efficient and effective ICC. With regard to 
enabling the ICC to be proactive and to have an additional means by which to combat 
international crime by seizing the proceeds of crime more generally, the Rome Statute
empowers the Court to order measures to effect its orders for forfeiture of the proceeds of 
crimes within its jurisdiction.183
Orders for forfeiture are also available under the Rome Statute. Article 77(2) addresses the 
Court’s ability to order forfeiture of property derived from crime as part of a convicted 
individual’s sentence. In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order the forfeiture of 
proceeds, property, and assets derived directly or indirectly from the crime, without prejudice 
to the rights of bona fide third parties. Article 77(2) also enables the Court to impose fines as 
part of the sentences it levies.184 Part 10 of the Rome Statute addresses the enforcement of the 
ICC’s sentences and orders, and specifically imposes a duty on States Parties to enforce fines 
and forfeiture measures as penalties.185
to impose upon a defendant, on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be 
just.’). Neither the ICTR nor the ICTFY are empowered to impose fines, although both Tribunals have adopted 
provisions for fines as penalties for procedural misconduct, such as contempt of the Tribunals. See ICTR Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, rules 77(A), 91(D), available at http://www.ictr.org; ICTFY Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, UN Doc IT/32/Rev 21, rules 77(H), 77bis, 91(E), available at 
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Under the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, States Parties must ensure 
that they have laws and procedures in place to perform four primary functions: (1) trace, 
freeze, and seize the proceeds of ICC crime;186 (2) effect forfeiture of the proceeds of 
crime;187 (3) collect fines;188 and (4) transfer to the Court any property or proceeds they obtain 
as a result of their enforcement of a judgment of the Court.189 States have proceeded in 
distinct and creative manners in implementing these obligations within their domestic laws.190
The Manual for Ratification and Implementation identifies three general approaches:
(1) providing for a general power to enforce all orders directly or
(2) separate powers for both fines and reparation orders or
(3) general power for enforcement but leaves out procedural details191
Australia and the UK are to be counted in the first approach. They convert the ICC orders into 
orders issued by the national courts.192 In addition, these two countries adopt a ‘self-contained 
property or assets ordered by the Court to be forfeited, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.’ 
Ibid art 109(2).
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regime for executing such orders.’193 Canada adopts a largely similar approach to that in 
Australia and the UK albeit through the amendment of existing legislation to facilitate the 
provision of the specific assistance requested by the ICC. A hybrid approach is seen in 
Norwegian legislation which provides for general authority to carry out ICC requests within 
the framework of its existing legislation.194
CONCLUSION
The ICC will provide an indispensable backup to national jurisdictions in deterring, 
investigating, and prosecuting serious international crimes. The momentum behind the ICC 
testifies to the increasing realization by countries that international norms may require 
international enforcement mechanisms, especially where individual perpetrators are beyond 
the reach of their own domestic courts. Signing, ratifying, and implementing the ICC provides 
States with an opportunity to review their existing criminal procedures, and to ensure that 
these are consonant with international standards such as those relating to due process, the 
protection of victims and witnesses, and jurisdiction over internationally recognised crimes. 
The ICC will provide important incentive for States to fine tune their domestic penal 
mechanisms and importantly obviate the need to establish reactive ad hoc international 
tribunals on a case by case which in practice has proved to be particularly difficult in view of 
the political goodwill required. 
The ICC in comparison to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals contains elaborate 
guidelines in relation to both the nature and manner of fulfilling obligations encapsulated in 
the Rome Statute. This paradoxically both weakens and strengthens the Court. As noted by Dr 




Goran Sluiter, ‘[t]he ad hoc tribunals were established with limited mandate. As a result of 
their swift creation, the Tribunals, especially the judges themselves, created much of the law. 
Therefore it comes as no surprise that the judges have opted for what is, in their eyes, the 
most effective cooperation regime. On the other hand, the establishment of the ICC by treaty 
triggered protracted rounds of negotiations, which soon revealed that participating states were 
not prepared to have the institution shape its own laws in any way. Since the shaping of the 
legal assistance regime was left to the participating states, the resulting compromise left the 
system significantly weaker on a number of points.’195 Despite this, it is of practical 
importance that the court retains discretion to determine the content of the duty to cooperate 
and in many instances, its cooperation regime is predominantly hierarchical and vertical in 
nature.196
The success of the ICC will ultimately be determined by the level of cooperation it receives 
from States. Having no police force, military, or territory of its own, the ICC will rely heavily 
on States Parties to, among other things, arrest individuals and surrender them to the Court, 
collect evidence, and serve documents in their respective territories. This assistance will be 
central to the Court’s ultimate success. Without this assistance, the ICC will find itself 
seriously crippled in conducting its proceedings and meeting the lofty aspirations of the 
international community. So far the outlook is good, States Parties have overwhelmingly put 
in place the necessary legal and administrative mechanisms that will facilitate cooperation 
with the ICC. It remains to be seen whether this enthusiasm will be reflected once the ICC’s 
operations get underway.
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